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Respondents Beaver Creek Coal Company and CIGNA 
Insurance Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Beaver Creek11) hereby file their Brief in response to 
Petitioner's Petition For Review on appeal to this Court from the 
Industrial Commission, The Industrial Commission denied 
Petitioner's motion for review of the administrative law judge's 
order denying Petitioner's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 35-1-82.53(2)(1988), 
35-1-86(1988), 63-46b-16(1988), and 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1988), and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Beaver Creek submits that the issues on appeal and the 
applicable standards of appellate review are as follows: 
(1) Whether Petitioner's 1983 industrial accident is 
the medical cause of his disability.' 
The proper standard of review of this issue is the 
"substantial evidence" test because medical causation is a 
'Though the Commission found that Petitioner did not prove 
medical or legal causation, the critical issue in this case is 
whether Petitioner's disability is the medical result of the 1983 
industrial accident* 
1 
factual issue. Grace Drilling Co, v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). The Industrial Commission (the 
"Commission") found that Petitioner failed to show that his 
disability was legally and medically caused by the 1983 accident, 
(R. 114). Petitioner claims that this Court should apply a 
"correction of error" standard, but this Court has held that 
whether a disability is medically the result of a work related 
activity is a question of fact. Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991). The proper standard of review 
for questions of fact is the "substantial evidence" test. 
Johnson v. Board of Review. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 
1992). Findings of fact are affirmed if they are "supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." IsJ., citing Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code Annotated § 63-
46(b)-16(4)(g) (1989)). Petitioner does not explain why this 
issue could be considered a question of law and his argument for 
a correction of error standard is completely without support. 
(2) Whether Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-99 (1981) is an 
unconstitutional statute of repose. 
The standard of appellate review of this issue is 
correction of error because the Commission lacks authority to 
address the constitutionality of the statute. Avis v. Board of 
2 
Review. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Utah App. 1992). Petitioner 
argues on p. 1 of his brief that the issue is "whether the 
Industrial Commission committed error in finding that the 
Petitioner had failed to satisfy certain statute of limitations." 
This is not a correct statement of the issue because Petitioner 
argues that § 35-1-99 is unconstitutional, not that the 
Commission misapplied it. 
(3) Whether the Industrial Commission abused its 
discretion in not referring this matter to a medical panel. 
The standard of review of this issue is "abuse of 
discretion." The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that, in some 
cases, failure to convene a medical panel is an "abuse of 
discretion." Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission. 
703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). This Court also applied an abuse 
of discretion standard when reviewing whether an ALJ should have 
referred the medical causation issue to a medical panel. 
Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial Commission. 761 P.2d 572, 577 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes and rule are determinative in 
this appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated S 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988), § 35-1-77 
(1982) and S 35-1-99 (1981) and Utah Administrative Code R490-1-
3 
9. The determinative statutes and rule are set forth in full in 
Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's Order 
denying the Motion for Review of the ALJ's Order denying workers' 
compensation benefits. The Commission denied the Motion for 
Review because Petitioner did not prove that the 1983 industrial 
accident was the legal and medical cause of his disability. 
(R. 114). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On September 26, 1988, Petitioner filed a claim for 
benefits for injuries which allegedly occurred at work at Beaver 
Creek Coal Co. on March 6, 1987. (R. 51-52). That claim was 
dismissed and Petitioner filed another claim on May 22, 1990 
alleging injuries for a work accident which occurred sometime in 
1983. (R. 111). Beaver Creek submits that Petitioner's 
disability was not caused by the 1983 industrial accident, but is 
due solely to Petitioner's degenerative spine condition. 
A hearing before an ALJ was held on December 4, 1990. 
(R. 51). Petitioner's attorney stated at the hearing that 
Petitioner was not involved in a 1987 industrial accident. (R. 
52). The ALJ found, among other things, that Petitioner may have 
4 
been involved in an industrial accident in 1983 or 1984 but that 
the accident did not cause the disability for which Petitioner 
seeks relief. (R. 65). The ALJ dismissed Petitioner's claim 
with prejudice and Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the 
Commission. The Commission upheld the ALJ's Order but 
substituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law for those 
of the ALJ. (R. 113). On August 10, 1992, the Commission denied 
Petitioner's Motion for Review, finding that Petitioner failed to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that his disability was 
legally and medically caused by the industrial accident. 
(R. 114). The Commission also found that Petitioner's claims for 
temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial and related 
compensation arising from the 1983 accident are barred by the 
statute of limitations in U.C.A. S 35-1-99. (R. 114). 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioner has been diagnosed with a severe progressive 
spine disease. (R. 145). Petitioner seeks workers' compensation 
benefits for his disability claiming that it was caused by a 1983 
industrial accident. (R. Ill). The exact date of the industrial 
accident is unknown, but it apparently occurred sometime in 1983 
when Petitioner was on a tractor watering a roadway and was 
pulled under a belt line. (R. 53). After the accident 
Petitioner walked 3/5 of a mile out of the mine and did not 
5 
require or receive medical attention. (R. 64). Petitioner 
testified that he completed some sort of accident report form 
after the 1983 accident, but no such report form has been 
located. (R. 53). There is no evidence that Petitioner or his 
employer completed an Employers First Report of Injury form. The 
Commission found that the form which Petitioner completed was an 
MSHA form. (R. 117). 
Petitioner continued to work for four years after the 
accident, but claimed at the hearing that he began experiencing 
pain within six months after the accident. (R. 54). Petitioner 
did not see a doctor until over three years after the accident. 
He testified that he treated the pain with Anacin. (R. 54, 111). 
Petitioner took no time off of work because of the industrial 
accident and did not mention the industrial accident to his 
family physician. (R. 56, 111). 
Before he filed a claim on May 22, 1990 for the 1983 
industrial accident, Petitioner filed a claim seeking benefits 
for an alleged 1987 accident. (R. Ill). Petitioner did not 
produce an Employers First Report of Injury Form for a 1987 
accident and his attorney has now conceded that there was no 1987 
accident. (R. 60). At the hearing before the ALJ Petitioner 
said that any reference by Dr. Kirkpatrick to a March, 1987 
6 
industrial incident was incorrect. (R. 55). The 1983 industrial 
accident is the subject of this appeal. 
After working for over three years after the 1983 
industrial accident, Petitioner went to see a Dr. Jackson and 
Dr. Jackson referred Petitioner to Dr. Kirkpatrick. (R. 206). 
Dr. Kirkpatrick first saw Petitioner on March 11, 1987 and in a 
letter to Dr. Jackson on that day Dr. Kirkpatrick stated that 
Petitioner's x-rays show "severe spondylosis and disc disease, 
especially at C6-7." (R. 215). Petitioner's medical records 
reveal that he continued to see Dr. Kirkpatrick until August of 
1989. (R. 142). Petitioner's medical records also indicate that 
Petitioner's condition continued to deteriorate after his first 
visit to Dr. Kirkpatrick. Dr. Kirkpatrick stated in his 
April 28, 1989 records that Petitioner had "progressively severe 
spondylosis everywhere and as fast as we try to fix one area, 
another area crops up and becomes a problem." (R. 145). 
Dr. Kirkpatrick also stated on that day "I consider the patient 
medically, completely disabled because of his progressive 
spondyliotic disease involving all parts of spine." (R. 145). 
Petitioner saw Dr. Kirkpatrick several times between 
his first visit on March 11, 1987 and his last recorded visit on 
August 18, 1989. Dr. Kirkpatrick performed surgeries on 
Petitioner's neck and back, but Petitioner's condition only 
7 
improved temporarily. On January 30, 1989 Dr. Kirkpatrick's 
impression of Petitioner was "C4-5 disc disease and spondylosis, 
gradually progressive and worse but without radiculopothy at this 
time" and "chronic L5-S1 severe disc disease and spondylosis with 
grade I spondylolisthesis . . .•• (R. 148). On April 28, 1989 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's impression of Petitioner was "cervical, 
thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, progressively severe." 
(R. 145). Finally, on August 18, 1989, Petitionees last 
recorded visit to Dr. Kirkpatrick, the doctor's impression was 
"progressive diffuse spondylosis of cervical, thoracic and lumbar 
spine, currently most symptomatic in the cervical area." 
(R. 143). On that day Dr. Kirkpatrick also stated: "I don't 
think surgery is going to be the answer for him and I think the 
best thing we can do now is have him see a rheumatology 
specialist . . . " (R. 143). 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's medical records do not say that 
Petitioner's condition was caused by the 1983 industrial 
accident. The only evidence directly connecting Petitioner's 
disability to anv alleged industrial accident is a letter from 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's to Petitioner's attorney and a summary of 
Medical Record form. (R. 149, 217). Both of the above documents 
link Petitioner's injury to a 1987 accident not the 1983 
accident. Dr. Kirkpatrick's records do refer to a 1987 accident; 
8 
they say that Petitioner injured his neck when he bumped into a 
screen in 1987, (R. 194). 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's records also indicate that Petitioner 
had neck pain dating back twelve years. (R. 194). Petitioner 
was asked about this twelve year old neck pain at the hearing 
before the ALJ. At first Petitioner said he could not explain 
the doctor's reference to the old neck pain and then he denied 
that he ever mentioned a twelve year old neck pain to Dr. 
Kirkpatrick. (R. 54). 
In an order dated August 10, 1992 the Commission 
substituted its finding of fact and conclusions of law for those 
of the ALJ and found that Petitioner did not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 1983 industrial accident 
caused his disability. (R. 114). The Commission found that 
there was an accident in 1983 but that Petitioner sustained only 
minor injuries and that the accident did not cause Petitioner's 
disability. (R. 114). The Commission concluded that there was 
no 1987 industrial accident (R. 113). Finally, the Commission 
found that Petitioner failed to timely file claims for temporary 
total, temporary partial, and permanent partial disability 
compensation and therefore they were barred by the statute of 
limitations imposed by section 35-1-99 (1981). (R. 114). 
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The Commission supported its conclusion that Petitioner 
did not prove medical causation by highlighting specific facts in 
the record. The Commission emphasized Dr. Kirkpatrick's 
impression that Petitioner had spondylosis. (R. 112). Also, the 
Commission noted Dr. Kirkpatrick's July 1, 1988 medical records 
which stated that Petitioner's lumbar spine x-rays "showed a 
significant grade 7 L5-S1 spondylolisthesis with associated 
severe disc disease and spondylosis.1' (R. 112). The Commission 
also emphasized Dr. Kirkpatrick's October 19, 1988 medical 
records which say that Petitioner's past history was 
••noncontributory to his condition, except for a long life of hard 
labor, which contributed to both upper and lower spinal disease." 
(R. 112). Finally, the Commission discounted Dr. Kirkpatrick's 
statement that Petitioner's condition is at least partially 
related to the March 6, 1987 industrial accident because 
Petitioner's attorney stated that there was no 1987 industrial 
accident. (R. 113). 
After considering the above facts, the Commission found 
that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
Petitioner's disability was medically caused or aggravated by the 
industrial accident. (R 113). The Commission also stated that 
there was no basis on which to refer the case to a medical panel 
because they "have been shown no conflicting medical reports, and 
10 
the applicant has failed to carry his burden of persuasion.11 (R. 
113) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner seeks permanent total disability benefits 
for a degenerative condition in his spine which he alleges was 
caused by a 1983 industrial accident, despite the fact that he 
did not seek any medical attention for the alleged injury until 
over three years after the accident and returned to work 
immediately following the accident. (R. 34, 111). Petitioner's 
disability is caused by a progressive spine condition and not by 
the 1983 industrial accident. Petitioner has provided no medical 
evidence linking the 1983 industrial accident to his disability, 
let alone proving that it caused his disability. The Commission 
found that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the 1983 accident was the medical or legal cause of 
his disability. The Commission made the factual finding of no 
medical causation based on the facts in the record. The proper 
standard of review of that finding is whether it is supported by 
substantial evidence, which it clearly is. 
In this case. Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence 
supporting the findings of the Commission nor has he shown that 
there is not substantial evidence supporting the Commission's 
finding. In order to have a factual finding overturned on 
11 
appeal, Petitioner must marshal the evidence and show that the 
Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Because Petitioner did not do this, this Court must defer to the 
unchallenged factual findings of the Commission. 
The Commission also found that some of Petitioner's 
claims are barred by Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-99. Petitioner 
argues that S 35-1-99 is an unconstitutional statute of repose. 
This Court, however, recently found that § 35-1-99 is not a 
statute of repose but a constitutional statute of limitation. 
The Court should not reach the statute of limitations issue, 
however, because the failure to prove medical causation is 
dispositive of all the issues in this case. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that the Commission abused 
its discretion by not referring this matter to a medical panel, 
but there was absolutely no reason to refer this case to a 
medical panel because there was no evidence of medical causation. 
Petitioner's medical records indicate that he has a severe 
degenerative spine condition but Petitioner provides no evidence 
to link his condition to the 1983 accident. In addition, 
Petitioner worked for over three years following the industrial 
accident and neither the Petitioner nor his doctors have 
explained how the accident caused symptoms which did not occur 
until some three and a half years after the accident. Finally, 
12 
referral to a medical panel is not mandatory, but is in the 
discretion of the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
!• THE PETITION FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE 
PETITIONER DID NOT PROVE THAT THE 1983 INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT CAUSED HIS DISABILITY AND BECAUSE HE FAILED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL TO THIS COURT. 
A. Petitioner Has Provided No Evidence That The 198 3 
Accident is the Medical Cause of His Disability. 
In order to receive workers' compensation benefits, 
Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
disability was caused by an industrial accident. Large v. 
Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). "The 
medical causation requirement will prevent an employer from 
becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims.*1 Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 
27 (Utah App. 1986). 
In this case, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden 
of proof.2 (R. 114). The Commission found that Petitioner's 
Petitioner argues that workers' compensation laws should be 
liberally construed. Liberal construction does not, however, 
relieve Petitioner from the requirement of proving all elements 
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, including med-
ical causation. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 
709 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah stated 
11
 [wjhile disability claims are liberally construed in favor of 
awarding benefits . . . we do not overturn the Commission's 
findings unless they are arbitrary or capricious, wholly without 
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the 
evidence or without substantial evidence to support them." 
13 
back condition was not caused by the 1983 industrial accident. 
(R. 114). Indeed, Petitioner's medical records indicate that his 
disability is due to disc disease, progressive spondylosis and 
spondylolisthesis. (R. 148). Dr. Kirkpatrick stated in his 
records "I consider the patient medically completely disabled 
because of his progressive spondylitic disease involving all 
parts of his spine.w (R. 145). (Emphasis added.) The lack of a 
connection between his problem and the accident is shown by the 
fact that the accident occurred in 1983 yet Petitioner did not 
see a doctor until late in 1986. Also, Petitioner returned to 
work following the accident and continued working for 3 1/2 years 
until his degenerative condition became unbearable. (R. 54). 
Petitioner presented no evidence to connect his degenerative 
spine condition with the 1983 industrial accident. 
On page 11 of his brief Petitioner argues that Beaver 
Creek and the other Respondents did not provide medical evidence 
suggesting that Petitioner's condition was not related to the 
1983 accident. It is Petitioner's burden to prove causation, not 
Respondents' burden to disprove causation. Petitioner provided 
no evidence of causation for Beaver Creek to refute. The only 
evidence Petitioner refers to in his brief is in a letter from 
Dr. Kirkpatrick to Petitioner's attorney (Petitioner's Brief at 
p. 11), but the doctor's letter refers to a 1987 accident, which 
14 
Petitionees attorney says did not occur. (R. 149) . 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's February 27, 1989 letter states "I would 
estimate that his disability is at least partially related to his 
industrial injury of March 6, 1987, although some of the symptoms 
and problems certainly predated this event." (R. 149). 
(Emphasis added.) There is no reference to the 1983 accident. 
On Page 18 of his Brief, Petitioner argues that causation is in 
dispute because his medical records "add some confusion to the 
issue because of Dr. Kirkpatrick's referral to a nonexistent 1987 
industrial accident rather than the one in 1983." Dr. 
Kirkpatrick's reference to a 1987 accident, however, is in 
response to Petitioner's attorney's February 16, 1989 letter 
requesting that Dr. Kirkpatrick comment on whether Petitioner's 
disability was "significantly related to his industrial injury of 
March 6, 1987." (R. 225) (emphasis added). Petitioner provides 
no medical evidence of a connection between his condition and the 
1983 accident. 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's records do mention a ,,1982M 
industrial incident but do not say that the "1982" incident was 
the cause of Petitioner's disability. Instead, in an April 28, 
1989 letter to Dr. Max Morgan, Dr. Kirkpatrick states that he 
treated Petitioner "because of progressively severe cervical and 
15 
lumbar spondylosis causing neck pain, back pain and disfunction 
of all four limbs." (R. 144). 
B. Petitioner Did Not Marshal The Evidence In Favor 
Of The Commissions Finding. 
In order to overturn the factual findings of the 
Commission, Petitioner must first marshal the evidence supporting 
the Commission's finding and then show that the finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 
68. In Grace Drilling, this Court explained the application of 
the substantial evidence test for reviewing findings of fact: 
[i]t is also important to note that the 
9
whole record test' necessarily requires that 
a party challenging the Board's findings of 
fact must marshal[] all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. 
This Court also stated in Grace Drilling that: ,f[i]n undertaking 
such a review, this Court will not substitute its judgment as 
between two reasonable conflicting views, even though we may have 
come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de 
novo review.*1 Id., and: "[i)t is the province of the Board not 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it 
is for the Board to draw the inferences." Id., citing Board of 
Educ. of Montgomery County v. Pavnter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186, 
16 
1193 (1985). Finally, in Intermountain Health Care v. Board of 
Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992), this Court held that, 
in order to marshal the evidence, one must "amass the evidence 
supporting the ALJ's findings." Petitioner does not satisfy his 
obligation of marshaling the evidence simply by arguing his own 
position with no regard for the evidence supporting the findings 
of the Commission, id. When a petitioner only argues his own 
position and does not marshal the evidence, this Court has held 
that it will not disturb the findings of the ALJ and the 
Commission. Id. 
In this case, Petitioner did not even attempt to 
marshal the evidence in favor of the Commission's findings, nor 
does he explain his theory as to how he has proven that the 1983 
accident caused Petitioner's spondylosis and spondylolisthesis. 
Petitioner merely argues that "there was no medical evidence 
offered at the hearing which suggests that Mr. Denny's injuries 
were not at least partially the result of the industrial 
accident." Not only is this inaccurate, it does not amount to 
marshaling the evidence. 
Petitioner's excuse for not marshaling the evidence is 
an unfounded argument that the ALJ's findings of fact were 
inadequate and, therefore, he was denied the ability to marshal 
the evidence. In this case, it is the Commission's findings of 
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fact which are on review and the Commission's findings are 
adequate and clearly meet the standards set out in the recent 
case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Commission stated in its Order, "based on the concession of 
the respondents and our analysis of the evidence which flowed 
therefrom, we will substitute our findings and conclusions of law 
for those of the ALJ." (R. 113). The Commission can choose to 
use its own findings of fact and conclusions of law or it can use 
the ALJ's. Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743, 745 
(Utah 1984) . 
Adams requires findings which "indicate respectively 
(1) the issues decided, . . . (2) the legal interpretation and 
application made . . . and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in 
support of the decision . . ." Ifl. at 6. In this case, (1) the 
Commission addressed the question "whether there was shown to be 
medical causation" (R, 111) and found that Petitioner did not 
prove that his 1983 accident was the medical cause of his 
disability. (R. 114). (2) The Commission applied the law that 
compensation will be awarded only when the industrial accident is 
the medical and legal cause of the disability for which 
compensation is sought. (3) The Commission supported its 
decision by pointing to specific "subsidiary" facts regarding 
Petitioner's medical history. The Commission stated in its Order 
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that Dr. Kirkpatrick's records show "a significant grade one L5-
Sl spondylolisthesis with associated severe disc disease and 
spondylosis.11 (R. 112). The Commission also focused on Dr. 
Kirkpatrick's October 19, 1988 statement that Petitioner's past 
history was Hnoncontributory to his condition, except for long 
life of hard labor, which has contributed to both upper and lower 
spinal disease." (R. 112). Most importantly, the Commission 
pointed to the lack of medical evidence of causation between the 
1983 accident and Petitioner's condition. Petitioner stated and 
the Commission found that there was no industrial accident in 
1987 and, therefore, the Commission discounted the only causation 
evidence provided by Petitioner, Dr. Kirkpatrick's statement 
about the disability being partially due to a 1987 industrial 
accident. (R. 113). 
The Commission made adequate factual findings to 
support its conclusion of no medical causation and Petitioner 
failed to marshal the evidence in favor of that conclusion. 
Therefore, this Court should not disturb the Commission's 
findings.3 
^Petitioner argues on page 12 of his brief that the 
Commission's findings are inadequate and attempts to support his 
argument by claiming that the employer and the insurance carrier 
agreed that "The Decision and Order are not truly supported by 
adequate findings based on the entire record." (R. at 90). This 
statement referred to the AU's Order and not to the final Order 
of the Commission. As stated above, the Commission substituted 
its findings and conclusion for those of the ALJ. 
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II. PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR TEMPORARY TOTAL, TEMPORARY 
PARTIAL AND PERMANENT PARTIAL BENEFITS ARE BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN U,C,A, S 3 5-1-99, 
A. This Court Should Not Reach The Statute of 
Limitation Issue Because The Petition Can be 
Dismissed Solely on the Lack of Proof of Medical 
Causation. 
As discussed above, Petitioner has failed to meet his 
burden of proving that the 1983 industrial accident caused his 
disability and has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the 
Commission's findings. Therefore, if this Court finds that the 
Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence or 
that Petitioner failed to marshal the evidence, there is no 
reason to reach the statute of limitations issue because the 
finding of no medical causation is dispositive as to all of 
Petitioner's claims. 
B. U.C.A. < 35-1-99 is Not an Unconstitutional 
gtatVte Pf Rqpose. 
Petitioner failed to file a claim for compensation 
within the statute of limitations of U.C.A. § 35-1-99 (1981) 
which provides in part, "(ijf no claim for compensation is filed 
with the Industrial Commission within three years from the date 
of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation, 
the right to compensation shall be wholly barred. . . .M 
Petitioner does not deny that he did not file a claim within the 
time allowed in S 35-1-99 (1981). Rather, Petitioner argues that 
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§ 35-1-99 (1981) is an unconstitutional statute of repose which 
violates the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. In 
Avis v. Board of Review, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1992), 
however, this Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1974) is 
a statute of limitations and not an unconstitutional statute of 
repose. The relevant portion of § 3 5-1-99 did not change between 
1974 and 1981. At all relevant times § 35-1-99 read in part, 
" [i]f no claim for compensation is filed with the industrial 
commission within three years from the date of the accident . . . 
the right of compensation shall be wholly barred." This Court 
found that S 35-1-99 (1974) is a statute of limitations "because 
it runs from the date of injury, when the cause of action 
accrues, not from a point in time unrelated to when the cause of 
action arose." JjJ* at 58. A statute of repose, on the other 
hand, " . . . prevents a suit a statutorily specified number of 
years after a particular event occurs, without regard to when the 
cause of action accrues." Is}., quoting, Velarde v. Board of 
Review, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992). In Avis, this Court 
also stated that the petitioner cited no cases in which a statute 
of limitations was held to violate the open courts provision. 
Id. 
Despite the fact that this Court found that § 35-1-99 
was not a statute of repose, it applied the open courts 
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constitutional analysis to the petitioner's claim. Id. at 58. 
The petitioner in Avis was injured on the job in 1968 and was 
treated for recurring back pain from 1968 to 1982. Id. at 57. 
In 1988, the Petitioner was given a permanent partial impairment 
rating due to his injury. I<i. On December 4, 1990, the 
Petitioner filed a claim seeking permanent partial disability 
benefits, but the ALJ ruled that the petitioner's claim was 
barred by S 35-1-99 (1974). The petitioner argued that § 35-1-99 
was an unconstitutional statute of repose because it precluded 
him from filing a claim before he received a rating and before he 
knew that he was permanently partially impaired. Id. at 58. 
However, this Court held that, though courts have recognized 
exceptions to alleviate the harshness of statutes of limitation, 
those cases usually involve situations in which a petitioner had 
no way of knowing of the injury. Is|. at 59. Because the 
petitioner in Avis knew of his injury within the limitation 
period, the open courts provision was not violated. Id. The 
same is true in this case. Petitioner claims that he had pain 
six months after his industrial accident and therefore, if this 
is true. Petitioner knew that he may have been injured and had 
notice of a potential claim. 
Avis clearly held that S 35-1-99 is not an 
unconstitutional statute of repose. It controls in this case. 
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Therefore, because Petitioner did not file within the time 
provided for in § 35-1-99, his claims for temporary total, 
temporary partial, and permanent partial benefits are clearly 
barred. 
III. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL BECAUSE THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION TO WARRANT REFERRAL. 
A. Referral to a Medical Panel Was Unnecessary 
Because Petitioner Did Not Provide Evidence to 
Put Causation in Issue. 
In this case, Petitioner did not meet his burden of 
proof; he provided absolutely no evidence that the 1983 
industrial accident caused or contributed to his current 
disability. Failure to refer to a medical panel cannot be an 
abuse of discretion when there is no evidence of causation. 
Petitioner has the burden of proving causation and is not 
entitled to have his case referred to a medical panel in order to 
attempt to create a causation issue. If there is a causation 
issue, then the Commission may refer to a medical panel to assist 
in resolving that issue, but when causation is not at issue, 
there is no reason to expend state resources to convene a medical 
panel. In Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 
572, 577 (Utah App. 1988), this Court stated in response to an 
argument that failure to refer to a medical panel was an abuse of 
discretion, "we cannot say that the administrative law judge 
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abused his discretion in not referring this case to a medical 
panel when there was medical evidence to support his finding of 
medical causation.11 It follows that there is also no requirement 
to refer to a medical panel when there is no evidence of 
causation. 
In this case, there is no evidence of causation and, 
conversely, there is ample evidence that Petitioner's condition 
was caused by a degenerative spine disease. Dr. Kirkpatrick's 
April 28, 1989 letter to Dr. Max Morgan states, ,fI consider the 
patient medically completely disabled because of his progressive 
spondylitic disease involving all parts of his spine." (R. 145) 
(emphasis added). 
B. Utah Administrative Code Section R490-1-9 Does Not 
APPIV to Petitioner's Case Because There Are No 
MSignificant Medical Issues" Involved. 
Petitioner argues that R490-1-9 of the Utah 
Administrative Code mandates reference to a medical panel in this 
case. Even if R490-1-9 were mandatory, which it is not, it does 
not apply to Petitioner's case because there is not a 
"significant medical issue" in the case. Petitioner argues that 
there is a significant medical issue because medical causation is 
the primary issue in this case. There is no doubt that medical 
causation is the primary issue, but Petitioner has clearly failed 
to prove medical causation because there is no medical evidence 
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to support his contention. R490-1-9 says that significant 
medical issues "generally" must be shown by conflicting medical 
reports. There are no conflicting reports in this case. There 
is no evidence of causation, therefore, even if R490-1-9 did 
mandate referral to a panel in some cases, it certainly does not 
do so in this case since there is no "significant medical issue." 
C. Referral to a Medical Panel is Discretionary. 
Reference to a medical panel is discretionary. Utah 
Code Ann. S 35-1-77(1)(a) (1982) states: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment, and 
if the employer or its insurance carrier 
denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the commission. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The above statute makes referral to a medical panel 
discretionary; the Commission may appoint a medical panel but is 
not required to do so. In Hone v. J.F. Shea Company, 728 P.2d 
1008, 1012 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Reference to the medical panel is controlled by statute. In 
1982, the Legislature amended U.C.A. 5 35-1-77 (1953) and changed 
the requirement of mandatory referral to a medical panel to 
permissive referral." Id. 
Despite the above statute and case lav, Petitioner 
argues that R490-1-9 mandates referral to a medical panel. 
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R490-1-9, however, simply sets out guidelines and cannot be 
construed as mandatory for a number of reasons. The first reason 
that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as mandatory is that the 
Legislature intended referral to a medical panel to be 
discretionary. The Legislature specifically changed reference to 
a medical panel from mandatory to discretionary. Before it was 
amended U.C.A. 35-1-77 (1953) read: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury or by accident or for death 
arising out of or in the course of employment 
and where the employer or insurance carrier 
denies liability, the Commission shall refer 
the medical aspects of this case to a medical 
panel appointed by the Commission. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
In 1982, the Legislature amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and 
changed the shall refer to a medical panel to may refer to a 
medical panel. Hone. 778 P.2d at 1012. R490-1-9 should not be 
read to circumvent legislative intent. 
The second reason that the regulation cannot be 
construed as mandatory is that, if it were mandatory, it would be 
void as beyond the scope of U.C.A. S 35-1-77 (1988). The word 
"may* in S 35-1-77 indicates that it is discretionary and 
therefore it cannot be made mandatory by a regulation. In 
Crpwther vf National M\it, Insi CP., 762 p.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 
App. 1988), this Court stated: 
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An administrative agency's authority to 
promulgate regulations is limited to those 
regulations which are consonant with the 
statutory framework, and neither contrary to 
the statute or beyond its scope. 
Any regulation which makes referral to a medical panel mandatory 
is not consistent with and goes beyond the scope of U.C.A. 
§ 35-1-77 and is therefore void. 
The final reason that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as 
mandatory is that the ALJ can disregard the finding of the 
medical panel in light of other evidence. U.C.A. § 35-1-77(2)(d) 
(1982) states: 
The Commission may base its findings and 
decisions on the report of the panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants, but is not 
bound by the report if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 
1988), the Supreme Court of Utah found that the Commission can 
reject the finding of the medical panel and rely on other 
evidence in the record. Also, in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory 
v. Keller. 657 P.2d 1367, 1371-1372 (Utah 1983), the Supreme 
Court of Utah upheld the Commission's finding regarding medical 
causation despite the fact that the medical panel made contrary 
findings. The Pittsburgh Testing court relied on other medical 
evidence and rejected the medical panel report. Id. Where, as 
here, the Commission determines that Petitioner has not met his 
27 
burden of proof and there is no evidence of causation, it is 
unnecessary to refer a case to a medical panel. It would be 
illogical to require the Commission to do so in light of the fact 
that it could rely on other medical evidence and disregard the 
findings of the medical panel. It would also be a costly waste 
of state resources to require reference of every matter to a 
medical panel when the Commission determines that a petitioner 
has not even provided enough evidence to put medical causation in 
dispute. 
Petitioner essentially argues for mandating referral to 
a medical panel every time a petitioner cannot prove causation. 
This is contrary to the 1982 amendment to U.C.A. § 35-1-77 and to 
the spirit of the case lav, Champion Home Builders, 703 P.2d at 
308, and should not be permitted.4 The Commission did not abuse 
its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Beaver Creek respectfully 
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Review. 
The August 10, 1992 Order of the Industrial Commission should be 
affirmed because Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of 
*Though Petitioner argues for mandatory referral to a 
medical panel, he also cites Champion Home Builders on p. 19 of 
his brief- Champion Home Builders, however, clearly holds that 
reference to a medical panel is in the discretion of the 
Commission. 702 P.2d at 308. 
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the evidence that the 1983 industrial accident caused his 
disability. Indeed, Petitioner provided no evidence of 
causation. The Commission reviewed the medical records and made 
a factual determination that there was no evidence of causation. 
Petitioner did not marshal the evidence in support of that 
determination and therefore the Order of the Industrial 
Commissions should be affirmed. 
DATED this 22* day of January, 1993. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven J^/Aeschbacher 
George S. Adondakis 
Attorneys for Beaver Creek Coal Co. 
and Cigna Insurance Co. 
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E x h i b i t "A" 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substanUally 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency'6 prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988 
E x h i b i t "A 
35-1-77. Medical panel • Discretionary authority 
of commission to refer case • Findings and report 
• Objections to report • Hearing - Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for 
injury by accident, or for death, arising out of or 
in the course of employment, and where the 
employer or insurance carrier denies liability, the 
commission may refer the medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission and having the qualifications generally 
applicable to the medical panel set forth in section 
35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such 
study, take such X-rays and perform such tests, 
including post-mortem examinations where 
authorized by the commission, as it may determine 
and thereafter make a report in writing to the 
commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional 
findings as the commission may require. The 
commission shall promptly distribute full copies of 
the report of the panel to the applicant, the 
employer and the insurance carrier by registered 
mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen 
days after such report is deposited in the United 
States post office, the applicant, the employer or 
the insurance carrier may fik with the commission 
objections in writing thereto. If no objections are 
to filed within such period, the report shall be 
deemed admitted in evidence and the commission 
may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, but shall not be bound by such Tcport if 
there is other substantial conflicting evidence in 
the case which supports a contrary finding by the 
commission. If objections to such report are filed 
the commission may set the case for hearing to 
determine the facts and issues involved, and at 
such hearing any party so desiring may request the 
commission to have the chairman of the medical 
Ptnd present at the bearing for examination and 
cross-examination. For good cause shown the 
commission may order other members of the 
P*nd, with or without the chairman, to be present 
*t the hearing for examination and cross-
examination. Upon such bearing the written'report 
°f the panel may be received as an exhibit but 
shall not be considered as evidence in the case 
except as far as it is sustained by the testimony 
admitted. The expenses of such study and report 
by the medical panel and of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the 
fund provided for by section 35-1-68. mi 
E x h i b i t "A 
35-1-99. Notice of Injury and daim for 
compensation - limitation of action - Tolling 
period for filing daim. 
When an employee claiming to have suffered an 
injury in the Service of his employer fails to give 
notice to his employer of the time and place where 
the accident and injury occurred, and of the 
nature of the same, within 48 hours, when 
possible, or fails to report for medical treatment 
within said time! the compensation provided for 
herein shall be reduced 13ft; provided, that 
knowledge of such injury obtained from any 
source on the pan of such employer, his managing 
agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in 
authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the 
injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the 
employer to make an investigation into the facts 
and to provide medical treatment shall be 
equivalent to such notice; and no defect or 
inaccuracy therein shall subject the claimant to 
such reduction, if there was no intention to 
mislead or prejudice the employer in making his 
defense, and the employer was not, in fact, so 
misled or prejudiced thereby. If oo notice of the 
accident and injury is given to the employer within 
one year from the date of the accident, the right to 
compensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim 
for compensation is filed with the industrial 
commission within three years from the date of the 
accident or the date of the last payment of 
compensation, the right to compensation shall be 
wholly barred; provided, however, that the filing 
of a report or notice of accident or injury with the 
industrial commission, the employer or its 
insurance carrier, together with the payment of 
any compensatioo benefit or the furnishing of 
medical treatment by the employer or an insurance 
carrier, tbMh toll the period for Tiling such daim 
until the employer or its earner notifies the 
industrial commission and employee, in writing, of 
its denial of lability or further lability, as the case 
may be, for the industrial accident or injury, with 
instructions upon said notification of denial to the 
employee to contact the industrial commission for 
further advice or assistance to preserve or protect 
the employee's rights; and provided further, that 
the said daim for compensation in any event must 
be filed within 8 years from the date of the 
accident. i*i 
E x h i b i t "A" 
R490-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical 
Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commis-
sion adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physi-
cal impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the tempo-
rary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may 
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel 
report. Where there is a proffer of new written con-
flicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new 
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarifica-
tion. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize 
an injured worker to be examined by another physi-
cian for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical 
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing 
these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the 6tudy and report of a medi-
cal panel or medical consultant and of their appear-
ance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further 
medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the 
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
